As North Korea
has become a hot national security and foreign affairs issue of late the
politicians, press and public confront the dilemma of what to think and do. It
always seems that there is a general consensus which varies by degree upon how
much someone is a hawk, a moderate, a liberal, or even a bleeding heart. The US
consensus is that North Korea can’t be allowed to acquire the missile and
nuclear technology that would provide them with the capability to launch a
nuclear attack against the American homeland. This has been the basic strategy
for decades and by Administrations of every stripe.
North Korea,
of course, has their own positional policy regarding missile and nuclear
technology, albeit there is less variation in its perspective as there have
been fewer ‘leaders’ over the same time interval than has been the case for the
US. I suspect the lack of difference views available within North Korea
regarding their strategy is somewhat related to the consequences of not
following the ‘company line’. But their objective is the antithesis of US
policy.
The situation
is a perfect case study for geopolitical conflict. There are two primary
players, a host of secondary parties interested in supporting one side or the
other for their own reasons, and then there is the rest of the world that is
inextricably involved because whatever the primary players do affects them if
things go wrong.
So as always, the intelligence underlying the strategies might be worth an assessment. To the extent that there is intelligence at the heart of each side’s policy, it renders the issue a suitable topic for an intelligence test.
So as always, the intelligence underlying the strategies might be worth an assessment. To the extent that there is intelligence at the heart of each side’s policy, it renders the issue a suitable topic for an intelligence test.
How you score
on this test, would indicate how much your judgement would place you and the
rest of us in a quantum physics future state.
Question A: What is American position toward
North Korea? Select all that apply.
(1). North Korea must have regime
change
(2). North Korea cannot have nuclear
weapons
(3). North Korea will not be allowed
to have missiles with the range to target US domestic territories with nuclear
warheads
(4). North Korea must eliminate its
nuclear weapon capabilities
(5). North Korea must abide by the
UN’s non-proliferation treaty
(6). If North Korea reaches a point
where they have the ability to threaten US territory the US would use a
preemptive strike to remove the threat
(7). The US’s position on North Korea
is vague and unclear
Question B: What is North Korea’s position
regarding its nuclear and missiles program? Select all that apply.
(1). North Korea will develop nuclear
weapons to defend itself
(2). North Korea will develop missile
technology to defend itself
(3). North Korea will use preemptive
strikes if provoked by military actions
(4). North Korea will only respond
with nuclear weapons if invaded
(5). North Korea’s position is
constantly changing and is unclear
(6). North Korea’s position is
unreliable since it’s leader is unreliable
Question C: What strategies are being used by
the US to achieve its objectives with respect to North Korea?
Select all that apply.
Select all that apply.
(1). Negotiations with North Korea to
end their nuclear weapons program
(2). American military deployments in
South Korea as deterrent to the North’s military
(3). Economic sanctions imposed upon
North Korea and/or other nations that aid their nuclear weapons program
(4). Engage member nations of the UN to support
sanctions against North Korea in support of the UN’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation
policy
(5). Intelligence operations on North
Korean activities
(6). Negotiations with other nations,
particularly China, to use their influence with North Korea to help end North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program
(7). Covert operations to interfere
with North Korea’s nuclear program
Question D: What is the basic logic of the
US’s policy?
(1). The US will use any and all means
to completely annihilate North Korea if they use nuclear weapons against
America or an American ally
(2). Before, or if, North Korea
acquires a nuclear weapons capability to threaten the US, the US will use force
to eliminate those capabilities
(3). The US will continue sanctions
against North Korea until they agree to eliminate the weapons
(4). The US will keep all options on
the table in determining how it will respond to the state of North Korea’s
nuclear weapons capabilities
Question E: What is the basic logic of North
Korea’s policy?
(1). If they have nuclear weapons, no
one will threaten them
(2). Only if they have nuclear weapons
are they safe
(3). With nuclear weapons, they will
be able to regain control over South Korea
(4). A ‘first-use’ nuclear strategy
will prevent military action against them
Question F: If you concurrently apply the US
policy’s logic and North Korean policy’s logic, what is the resulting
conclusion?
(1). A stand-off will result
(2). The US will win the contest
(3). North Korea will win the contest
(4). Logically the US and North Korean
policies lead to each side reaching the necessity of having to use their nuclear
weapons against the other
(5). The situation is too complex for
which one can derive a logical conclusion
Question G: What are the other consequences
to the logic?
(1). The other regional nations will
be dragged over the brink regardless of which side they were aligned with.
(2). If one nation ‘blinks’ then it
increases the likelihood that the ‘winning?’ strategy will be applied to other
situations which are ‘viewed’ as similar. This of course creates more
opportunities to approach new ‘brinks’.
(3). Yet another war.
(4). Projecting the consequences are
really the problematic area because the mutually assured conflict result of
current policy logic converges, the consequences that follow diverge along multiple
independent factors. Consequences are an exponential space and are thus
intractable.
(5). Across the world, the outcome
will be viewed through the lens of each nation’s interests and values, and by
each groups’ objectives.
(6). No, it’s simply between the US
and North Korea
Answers:
Answer - A: 3
Rationale - A: 3 - The basic US policy is that
North Korea will not be allowed to become a threat to the US mainland with
nuclear ICBMs. This is the core policy.
All the other statements depict ways that that primary requirement could be achieved or is indicative of what more we know about the US policy’s implications; but they are not policy. 1, 4 and 5 are states that would conform to a removal of the threat, but are not the US’s policy position. 2 is a statement of desire but since North Korea has nuclear weapons, it is hardly a rational policy.
6 describes an option that the US could take if North Korea were to achieve or be near achieving the state that defies the stated US policy position.
7 would only be true if item 3 is not the US policy, or the policy is changing.
All the other statements depict ways that that primary requirement could be achieved or is indicative of what more we know about the US policy’s implications; but they are not policy. 1, 4 and 5 are states that would conform to a removal of the threat, but are not the US’s policy position. 2 is a statement of desire but since North Korea has nuclear weapons, it is hardly a rational policy.
6 describes an option that the US could take if North Korea were to achieve or be near achieving the state that defies the stated US policy position.
7 would only be true if item 3 is not the US policy, or the policy is changing.
Answer - B: 1, 2, 3
Rationale - B: North Korea’s policy (1, 2 and 3)
is couched in terms of its own defense. In believing that it will be attacked
by its enemies (the US being chief among them), it therefore must have the
means to protect itself. Thus, North Korea’s policy stems from a ‘belief’
system that need not have facts, or logic, or any rationality; and the ‘belief’
system justifies the necessity of their policy.
4 and 5 are not consistent with observed and stated positions.
6 isn’t a policy position but a factor that increases the risks from the policy that the ‘belief’ system justifies.
4 and 5 are not consistent with observed and stated positions.
6 isn’t a policy position but a factor that increases the risks from the policy that the ‘belief’ system justifies.
Answer - C: 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
Rationale - C: The US has and is using items 2,
3, 4, 5, and 6 to attempt to dissuade North Korea from continuing to pursue its
headlong rush to defend itself with nuclear ICBMs.
Item 1 has been attempted several times in the past, but no agreement has been reached or achieved that resolves the basic points of contention.
Item 7 is by its very nature not a known item, otherwise it wouldn’t be covert.
Item 1 has been attempted several times in the past, but no agreement has been reached or achieved that resolves the basic points of contention.
Item 7 is by its very nature not a known item, otherwise it wouldn’t be covert.
Answer - D: 2
Rationale - D: The US policy can be reduced to
an “If A then B” policy, which is what item 2 is (See question A).
1 is not the US’s North Korean, since it is dependent upon an actual attack by North Korea. That would be an “If C then B” policy where ‘C’ is an unprovoked attack by North Korea.
3 is one element of the current US strategy and is not the policy.
4 is a statement that as conditions change the reaction could change. This is a political statement that doesn’t actually mean anything.
1 is not the US’s North Korean, since it is dependent upon an actual attack by North Korea. That would be an “If C then B” policy where ‘C’ is an unprovoked attack by North Korea.
3 is one element of the current US strategy and is not the policy.
4 is a statement that as conditions change the reaction could change. This is a political statement that doesn’t actually mean anything.
Answer - E: 4
Rationale - E: 4 - The fear of nuclear weapons
is viewed as the ultimate threat by the North Korean and thus its best defense.
It is the modern equivalent of the Colt-45 in the America west, i.e., the great
equalizer; which is a naïve concept when you consider that the other side
doesn’t have a Colt but has a Gaitlin gun. Unfortunately, the logic simplifies
to a North Korean version of “If A then B”.
1 is an insufficient policy since its current existence invalidates its internal logic. 2 is basically a reiteration of item 1 and if it were true than the US policy would be invalid since the current state doesn’t constitute the “If A then B” state which is what US policy is attempting to prevent.
3 may be a long-term aspiration of North Korea but it isn’t their policy for acquiring nuclear weapons.
1 is an insufficient policy since its current existence invalidates its internal logic. 2 is basically a reiteration of item 1 and if it were true than the US policy would be invalid since the current state doesn’t constitute the “If A then B” state which is what US policy is attempting to prevent.
3 may be a long-term aspiration of North Korea but it isn’t their policy for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Answer - F: 4
Rationale - F: The problem with the two polices
is that they are mirror-imaged reflections of each other. But this doesn’t
simply put them in opposition to each other; instead it creates the very
situation that each side intends its logic to prevent. We are thus left with
the result that “If A happens then B will result, and because B will result it
is imperative for A to happen.”
I suppose that this is the logical equivalent of “brinksmanship”, but the current policies don’t account for the condition where neither side ‘blinks’.
Item 1 is more characteristic of the current state of affairs with each side ‘standing’ its ground.
2 and 3 are outcomes, but which one results is unclear if the result is 4 where the measure of the impact is more of which side is damaged the least.
Item 5 may be true for most of those involved in the conflict of wills. This is not necessarily a good thing, but it may be a true thing. It’s also possible that the logical result is understood and considered acceptable.
I suppose that this is the logical equivalent of “brinksmanship”, but the current policies don’t account for the condition where neither side ‘blinks’.
Item 1 is more characteristic of the current state of affairs with each side ‘standing’ its ground.
2 and 3 are outcomes, but which one results is unclear if the result is 4 where the measure of the impact is more of which side is damaged the least.
Item 5 may be true for most of those involved in the conflict of wills. This is not necessarily a good thing, but it may be a true thing. It’s also possible that the logical result is understood and considered acceptable.
Answer - G: 4 is the over-arching answer.
Rationale - G: All the items except 6 are
consequences. 4 is the generalized consequence that once the rock is dropped
into the pond, the ripples expand outward into the future. The laws of physics
don’t allow for an action without resulting effects.
No comments:
Post a Comment